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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
 
Appellants City of Passaic, Passaic Police Department, 
and Victor Jacalone appeal from a judgment entered upon 
a jury's determination that appellants violated the New 
Jersey Law Against Discrimination when they transferred 
appellee William Failla to a night shift which aggravated his 
back condition, and from the district court's orders denying 
their consolidated post-trial motions and their motion for 
reconsideration of the award of attorneys' fees to Failla. For 
the reasons set forth below, we will affirm the judgment 
entered against the City and the Police Department, vacate 
the judgment entered against Jacalone, and reverse the 
district court's order denying appellants' post-trial motions 
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insofar as it imposes individual liability on Jacalone, but 
will affirm the order in all other respects. We will also affirm 
the order denying appellants' motion for reconsideration of 
the attorneys' fee award. 
 
I. 
 
Failla served as a captain with the Passaic Police 
Department. In 1989, he suffered a work-related back 
injury for which he subsequently received a partial 
disability award pursuant to the Worker's Compensation 
Act. In 1991, Failla was transferred from day shift to night 
shift work. At trial, Failla testified that approximately one 
year prior to that transfer, Jacalone, then the Chief of the 
Passaic Police Department and Failla's immediate 
supervisor, advised Failla that he wanted to transfer Failla 
to the night shift. Failla stated that he informed Jacalone of 
his back pain, and that Jacalone responded that the night 
air would "do [him] good." 
 
Failla testified that following his transfer to the night 
shift, his back pain worsened. Several of Failla's co-workers 
also testified to his apparent discomfort on the night shift. 
Failla claimed that both the night air and the more 
strenuous duties required of the night captain aggravated 
his back condition. Failla also offered expert medical 
testimony in support of his claims. The expert testified that 
the cold and dampness of the night air, as well as the 
increased stress associated with the busier night shift, 
aggravated Failla's back condition. Failla requested a 
transfer back to a day shift on at least six occasions 
between 1992 and 1993. However, Failla was not reinstated 
to a day shift until November 1993, after he filed this suit 
and after Jacalone retired. 
 
While still working the night shift, Failla initiated this 
action against the City, the Police Department, and 
Jacalone in his official and individual capacities. Failla 
alleged several causes of action, many of which were 
dismissed prior to trial. Failla proceeded to trial on his 
claims against all three appellants based upon their alleged 
violation of the LAD, and against the City and the Police 
Department based on their alleged violation of the 
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Americans with Disabilities Act.1 Failla contended that day 
shift work constituted a reasonable accommodation of his 
back condition. 
 
At trial, the jury determined that Failla was not 
"disabled" within the meaning of the ADA, and judgment 
was accordingly entered in favor of the City and the Police 
Department on the ADA claim. The jury concluded, 
however, that Failla was "handicapped" within the meaning 
of the LAD, and that the City and the Police Department 
were liable for failing to accommodate Failla's handicap. 
The jury also concluded that Jacalone had engaged in 
discriminatory conduct within the scope of his employment, 
and the district court found him liable on that basis. The 
district court awarded Failla compensatory damages of 
$143,000, with costs. The district court denied appellants' 
subsequent motions for judgment as a matter of law, or in 
the alternative for a new trial, and awarded attorneys' fees 
to Failla. This appeal followed.2 
 
II. 
 
Appellants have appealed from multiple rulings of the 
district court, and different standards of review apply to 
different arguments that appellants have raised on appeal. 
Appellants' contention that Failla failed to establish a prima 
facie case under the LAD relates to their entitlement to 
judgment as a matter of law, and this court exercises 
plenary review over an order granting or denying a motion 
for judgment as a matter of law, applying the same 
standard as the district court. See Lightning Lube, Inc. v. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Prior to trial, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of 
Jacalone on the ADA claim, finding that the ADA does not impose 
individual liability. 
 
2. Failla has not cross-appealed any trial or pre-trial rulings. Failla's 
complaint had asserted claims pursuant to S 1983, as well as claims for 
punitive damages and intentional infliction of emotional distress (the 
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City, the Police 
Department, and Jacalone on the S 1983 claims and the claims for 
punitive damages; summary judgment in favor of Jacalone on the 
emotional distress claim; judgment as a matter of law in favor of the City 
and Police Department on the emotional distress claim). 
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Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d Cir. 1993). A court 
should grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law "only 
if viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
party opposing the motion, no jury could decide in that 
party's favor." Walter v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 985 F.2d 1232, 
1238 (3d Cir. 1993). Appellants' arguments relating to 
Jacalone's individual liability turn on the district court's 
interpretation of the effect of the jury's answers to 
interrogatories. We exercise plenary review over the district 
court's determination that the jury's findings resulted in a 
verdict of individual liability against Jacalone. See 
Bradford-White Corp. v. Ernst & Whitney, 872 F.2d 1153, 
1158 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 993 (1989). 
Appellants' challenges to the district court's evidentiary 
rulings relate to their right to a new trial, and an abuse of 
discretion standard applies to the district court's decision 
to grant or deny a new trial. See Rotondo v. Keene Corp., 
956 F.2d 436, 438 (3d Cir. 1992). Where, however, the 
district court's decision rests on the application of legal 
precepts, we exercise plenary review. See id. (citing Link v. 
Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 788 F.2d 918, 921 (3d Cir. 
1986)). Finally, in considering appellants' arguments that 
the district court improperly awarded attorneys' fees, we 
apply an abuse of discretion standard. See Rode v. 
Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1182-83 (3d Cir. 1990). The 
district court had jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. SS 1331, 1343, and 1367. This court has jurisdiction 
over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
III. 
 
Appellants raise four arguments on appeal. They contend 
that Failla failed to establish a prima facie case under the 
LAD, that the district court wrongly imposed a verdict of 
individual liability against Jacalone, that the district court 
erroneously admitted evidence of a worker's compensation 
judgment, and that the district court improperly awarded 
attorneys' fees to Failla. We will address these in turn. 
 
A. 
 
We first consider appellants' contention that Failla failed 
to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the 
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LAD. The LAD prohibits discrimination against any person 
who is or has been "handicapped," unless the handicap 
precludes the performance of employment. See N.J.S.A. 
S 10:5-4.1. The regulations promulgated pursuant to the 
statute require employers to make reasonable 
accommodations to the limitations of a handicapped 
employee unless the accommodation would impose an 
undue hardship on the employer. See N.J.A.C.S 13:13- 
2.5(b); see also Ensslin v. Township of North Bergen, 646 
A.2d 452, 458-59 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994). 
 
Appellants challenge two aspects of Failla's prima facie 
case under the LAD. First, appellants dispute thefinding 
that Failla was "handicapped," arguing that the jury's 
determination that Failla was not disabled under the ADA 
precluded its determination that Failla was handicapped 
under the LAD. Second, appellants contend that Failla 
failed to demonstrate any need for an accommodation. We 
find these arguments unpersuasive. 
 
The meaning and propriety of the jury's verdict with 
respect to the ADA claims on the one hand and the LAD 
claims on the other turns on a review of the statutory 
definitions of "disability" and "handicapped." Although the 
words are often treated interchangeably as a matter of 
common usage, we have expressed some skepticism as to 
whether the terms, as used in the ADA and LAD, are 
actually equivalent. See Olson v. General Elec. Astrospace, 
101 F.3d 947, 956 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
The ADA defines the term "disability" as "a physical or 
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of 
the major life activities . . . ." 42 U.S.C. S 12102(2)(A). The 
LAD, in contrast, applies to "handicapped" persons, defined 
by statute as those who suffer: 
 
       from physical disability, infirmity, malformation or 
       disfigurement which is caused by bodily injury, birth 
       defect or illness including epilepsy, and which shall 
       include, but not be limited to, any degree of paralysis, 
       amputation, lack of physical coordination, blindness or 
       visual impediment, deafness or hearing impediment, 
       muteness or speech impediment or physical reliance on 
       a service or guide dog, wheelchair, or other remedial 
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       appliance or device, or from any mental, psychological, 
       or developmental disability resulting from anatomical, 
       psychological, physiological or neurological conditions 
       which prevents the normal exercise of any bodily or 
       mental functions or is demonstrable, medically or 
       psychologically, by accepted clinical or laboratory 
       diagnostic techniques. Handicapped shall also mean 
       suffering from AIDS or HIV infection. 
 
N.J.S.A. S 10:5-5(q). In contrast to the ADA, the LAD 
definition of "handicapped" does not incorporate the 
requirement that the condition result in a substantial 
limitation on a major life activity. See Olson v. General Elec. 
Astrospace, 966 F. Supp. 312, 314-15 (D.N.J. 1997); 
Illingworth v. Nestle U.S.A., Inc., 926 F. Supp. 482, 488 
(D.N.J. 1996); Gimello v. Agency Rent-A-Car Sys., 594 A.2d 
264, 275 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (noting that the 
LAD definition of "handicapped" does not include a major 
life activity requirement). This lower standard under the 
statutory definition of "handicapped," as compared to the 
definition of "disability," negates any inconsistency in the 
jury's verdict with respect to the ADA and LAD claims, and 
the district court's instructions advised the jury of the 
different statutory definitions. 
 
We also disagree with the second aspect of appellants' 
challenge to Failla's prima facie case, and find that Failla 
adduced sufficient evidence to support the jury'sfinding 
that his back condition warranted a reasonable 
accommodation. Appellants contend that Failla failed to 
present medical evidence necessary to establish that he 
"needed" -- as opposed to merely "wanted"-- to work a day 
shift. We find, however, that the evidence demonstrated 
that Failla suffered from a painful back condition that was 
aggravated by night shift work. Failla adduced expert 
medical testimony indicating that the dampness and 
coldness of the night air, as well as the increased stress 
associated with the busier night shift, exacerbated his 
condition. Furthermore, the expert testified that working 
the night shift would disrupt Failla's sleeping patterns, 
which also negatively affected his condition. The expert 
stated that this combination of factors combined to reduce 
Failla's ability to function on the night shift. 
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Appellants, however, contend that two aspects of that 
expert's testimony undermine the claimed need of an 
accommodation. First, the expert acknowledged that cold 
and damp conditions during the day would also affect 
Failla's back condition. He also testified, however, that it is 
generally more cold and humid at night. Furthermore, he 
offered testimony that the night shift is busier and causes 
a disruption in sleeping patterns. 
 
Second, the expert stated that Failla's condition had 
worsened between the two occasions on which the expert 
examined him, even though Failla had been reinstated to a 
day shift in the interim. The actual effect of a transfer to a 
day shift on Failla's back condition, viewed in hindsight, is 
largely irrelevant to the question of appellants' obligation to 
make a reasonable accommodation at the time Failla 
requested the transfer. Furthermore, the expert did not 
address the extent to which the worsened condition 
reflected deterioration that occurred between the first 
examination and the reinstatement to a day shift, rather 
than between the reinstatement and the second 
examination. In fact, the expert specifically testified that a 
reduction in stress and change in schedule would make it 
easier for Failla to perform required activities, and Failla 
and other witnesses testified that his condition did improve 
after his reinstatement to a day shift. 
 
Accordingly, we find that these two aspects of the expert's 
testimony do not negate Failla's claimed need of an 
accommodation. Appellants have not argued that a transfer 
to a day shift constitutes an unreasonable accommodation, 
and the evidence demonstrated that Failla suffered from a 
back condition that was exacerbated by night shift work.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. We also reject appellants' suggestion, alluded to in this argument, 
that 
Failla failed to present evidence that his back condition precluded him 
from performing the essential functions of his job on the night shift. The 
jury was instructed that under the LAD reasonable accommodations 
were those that allowed a person with a disability to perform the 
essential functions. There was sufficient proof as to the demands of 
Failla's work, and as to the ways in which his condition impacted him 
in the performance of his work. Appellants do not challenge, nor do we 
address, the instructions themselves or the court's statement of the law 
as set forth therein. 
 
                                8 
  
We conclude that Failla adduced sufficient evidence to 
establish a prima facie case under the LAD. 
 
B. 
 
We now turn to appellants' challenge to the jury's verdict 
regarding the individual liability of Jacalone and the court's 
finding with respect thereto. Appellants raise two issues 
with respect to Jacalone's liability. First, they contend that 
the answers to interrogatories submitted to the jury do not 
warrant a conclusion that he is liable for aiding and 
abetting under S 10:5-12(e) of the LAD, and second they 
argue that the LAD does not contemplate the imposition of 
individual supervisor liability under S 10:5-12(a) of the act. 
We deal with the latter argument first.4  
 
It is apparent from the district court's instructions that 
the issue of liability under N.J.S.A. S 10:5-12(a) was not 
presented to the jury, and the only issue on which the jury 
was instructed was Jacalone's aiding and abetting liability 
under N.J.S.A. S 10:5-12(e). That the jury was not asked to 
impose liability on the basis of S 12(a) is clear due to a 
variety of factors. First, the district judge stated that only if 
the City and the Police Department were found liable could 
the jury consider Jacalone's individual liability, which is a 
classic aiding and abetting requirement. Moreover, in 
explaining the elements necessary to Jacalone's liability, 
the district judge's discussion closely paralleled portions of 
the discussion of aiding and abetting liability developed by 
his colleague Judge Irenas in Tyson v. Cigna Corp., 918 F. 
Supp. 836, 839 (D.N.J. 1996). Finally, in denying 
appellants' motion for judgment as a matter of law, the 
district judge indicates that in his view S 12(e) provides the 
only basis for employee liability, so that he did not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. We note at the outset that there is very little New Jersey case law 
interpreting the relevant provisions of the LAD as applied to individual 
employee liability. This case again demonstrates the difficulties 
associated with the lack of a certification procedure in New Jersey. See 
Hakimoglu v. Trump Taj Mahal Assocs., 70 F.3d 291, 302 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(Becker, J., dissenting) (noting that "[s]tates like New Jersey lacking a 
certification procedure face the threat that federal courts will 
misanalyze 
the state's law . . . ."). 
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recognize the theory that individuals can be liable as 
"employers" under S 12(a). As the issue of the imposition of 
S 12(a) liability was not submitted to the jury, we need not 
reach this issue. 
 
Turning to the aiding and abetting charge, as an initial 
matter, S 12(e) by its express terms contemplates individual 
liability of employees for aiding and abetting an LAD 
violation.5 In submitting the case to the jury, two questions 
were posed regarding Jacalone's conduct: 
 
       (1) Did the plaintiff prove, by a preponderance of the 
       evidence, that defendant Jacalone engaged in 
       discriminatory conduct? 
 
       (2) Did plaintiff prove, by a preponderance of the 
       evidence, that defendant Jacalone was acting in 
       the scope of his employment when he denied 
       plaintiff a transfer to a day shift? 
 
The court's instructions regarding these two questions were 
somewhat broader, indicating that Jacalone could be held 
liable for engaging in discriminatory conduct if the jury 
found that Jacalone knew that Failla was handicapped, 
knew that he needed an accommodation -- namely, a 
transfer to a day shift -- and failed to transfer him, and 
that he could be found to have acted in the scope of his 
employment if he had authority to transfer Failla and did 
not do so. The jury answered "yes" to both questions, and 
the district court concluded, based on those findings, that 
Jacalone had been found individually liable to Failla as an 
aider and abettor. Jacalone's counsel questioned that 
conclusion at trial and again on appeal, and argues that a 
finding that Jacalone acted in the scope of his employment 
does not lead to the imposition of individual liability. 
 
Accordingly, we must predict whether the New Jersey 
Supreme Court would determine that the answers to 
interrogatories in this case warranted a finding of individual 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The statute provides that it shall be an unlawful employment practice 
or unlawful discrimination "[f]or any person, whether an employer or an 
employee or not, to aid, abet, incite, compel, or coerce the doing of any 
of the acts forbidden under this act, or to attempt to do so." N.J.S.A. 
S 10:5-12(e). 
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liability against Jacalone. To resolve that question, we must 
consider whether the interrogatories and the corresponding 
instructions properly stated the law. No party has objected 
to the language of the interrogatories or instructions as 
such, although Jacalone's counsel's objection to the district 
court's ruling clearly calls them into question. We have 
discretion to review instructions, even sua sponte, if they 
are such that the jury was without adequate guidance on a 
fundamental question and our failure to consider the error 
would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See 
United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 576 F.2d 983, 987 
(3d Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 441 U.S. 506 (1979). 
For the reasons set forth below, we find that the jury was 
without adequate guidance on the question of Jacalone's 
individual liability, and we will exercise our discretion to 
review the interrogatories and instructions as part of our 
determination that a new trial is warranted. We will focus 
first on the legal relevance and appropriateness of the 
second interrogatory, and then the first. 
 
In its opinion denying appellants' motion for judgment as 
a matter of law, the district court indicated that it viewed 
Tyson as setting forth the standard for aiding and abetting 
liability under the LAD. According to the district court's 
interpretation, "Tyson stands for the proposition that, 
under the NJLAD, a supervisory employee may be held 
individually liable for discriminatory acts committed in the 
scope of his employment." The court in Tyson cites a New 
Jersey Superior Court decision analogizing aiding and 
abetting liability under the LAD to accomplice liability in 
the criminal context. See 918 F. Supp. at 840 (citing Baliko 
v. Stecker, 645 A.2d 1218 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994)). 
The Tyson court notes that criminal accomplice liability 
requires a finding of shared intent: " `[t]he aider and abettor 
must share the same intent as the one who actually 
committed the offense. There must be a community of 
purpose between the actual perpetrator and the aider and 
abettor.' " Id. (quoting State v. Newell, 378 A.2d 47, 52 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977)). The court then reasons that 
because a supervisor's acts within the scope of his 
employment are the acts of the employer, "a supervisor who 
engages in discriminatory conduct while acting within the 
scope of his employment shares the intent and purpose of 
 
                                11 
  
the employer (the principal) and may be held individually 
liable (as an accomplice) for aiding and abetting the 
employer's unlawful conduct." Id. at 841. In contrast, a 
supervisor acting outside the scope of his employment "ipso 
facto" does not aid and abet his employer, and is therefore 
not subject to accomplice liability under the LAD.6 Id. 
Courts in other jurisdictions have endorsed a similar 
analysis of aiding and abetting liability under state anti- 
discrimination statutes. See, e.g, Glickstein v. Neshaminy 
Sch. Dist., No. 96-6236, 1997 WL 660636, at * 12-13 (E.D. 
Pa. Oct. 22, 1997). 
 
It is apparent that this concept of shared intent was the 
key to the district court's view that a supervisor who 
commits a discriminatory act within the scope of his 
employment aids and abets a violation of the LAD and is 
subject to individual liability under S 12(e). The second 
interrogatory to the jury was based on this view. However, 
although civil aiding and abetting may to some extent be 
analogized to its criminal counterpart,7  the New Jersey 
Supreme Court has held that the element of shared intent 
necessary in the criminal context is not an element of 
aiding and abetting in the civil context. The court 
specifically stated that "[t]o borrow . . . from definitions of 
aiding and abetting liability in the criminal field, where 
criminal intent is stressed because the aider is a criminal 
principal, is entirely inappropriate in the context of the 
present statute which is basically a remedial, not a criminal 
one." Passaic Daily News v. Blair, 308 A.2d 649, 656 (N.J. 
1973).8 In its only comment on the LAD aiding and abetting 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The court also concludes that, since a non-supervisory employee plays 
no role in his employer's reaction to his discriminatory conduct, the non- 
supervisory employee does not share any intent or common purpose with 
his employer and is therefore not liable as an aider and abettor of the 
employer's violation of the LAD. See Tyson, 918 F. Supp. at 840-41. 
 
7. In Baliko, the New Jersey Superior Court states that the same 
meaning has applied to the terms "aid" and "abet" in both the civil and 
criminal contexts. See 645 A.2d at 1223 (citations omitted). The court 
does not, however, expressly refer to the shared intent requirement of 
criminal accomplice liability. 
 
8. We note that despite their seemingly different treatment of the analogy 
between civil and criminal aiding and abetting liability, the decisions in 
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provision, the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected an 
analogy to criminal accomplice liability and its shared 
intent requirement. The court rebuffed a newspaper's 
challenge to the validity of a regulation, promulgated under 
the LAD, prohibiting the publication of classified 
employment advertisements with race, gender, or age-based 
headings, finding that the newspaper that printed the ads 
could be held liable for aiding and abetting an employer's 
violation of the LAD, even in the absence of shared intent 
or common purpose between the newspaper and employer. 
See id. at 656-57. 
 
It should be noted that in Passaic Daily News, the court 
determined that shared intent was not necessary in order 
to find civil aiding and abetting, while in Tyson, the court 
found that the defendant's supervisory status satisfied the 
element of shared intent that it thought necessary for 
aiding and abetting liability. Taking guidance as we must 
from the New Jersey Supreme Court, we conclude that the 
issue of shared intent is irrelevant under the LAD. 9 
Accordingly, the district court interrogatory to the jury as to 
whether Jacalone, conceded to be a supervisor, acted in the 
scope of his employment, was not a relevant question for 
purposes of determining aiding and abetting liability. The 
real issue then becomes what are the elements of aiding 
and abetting, and did the court's instructions and the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Passaic Daily News and Baliko are not necessarily inconsistent. The 
court in Passaic Daily News referred specifically only to the intent 
requirement of criminal accomplice liability. See 308 A.2d at 656. In 
contrast, the court in Baliko does not mention the intent requirement, 
but focuses on the meaning of "aid" and "abet" as it relates to the 
assistance or encouragement that the aider or abettor provides. See 645 
A.2d at 1223. 
 
9. We note that its construction of the shared intent requirement is at 
the heart of the Tyson court's distinction between supervisory and non- 
supervisory employees. See 918 F. Supp. at 840-41. Our determination 
that the LAD does not include a shared intent requirement indicates that 
this is not a proper basis for such a distinction. Because the question of 
a non-supervisory employees's liability is not before us, we do not 
express any view on whether there is some other basis on which to 
distinguish between the aiding and abetting liability of supervisory and 
non-supervisory employees under the LAD. 
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remaining interrogatory sufficiently explore and probe the 
proper test. 
 
As this court has recognized, aiding and abetting liability 
traditionally applies to criminal offenses and "is not a well- 
settled mechanism for imposing civil liability." American Tel. 
& Tel. Co. v. Winback & Conserve Program, 42 F.3d 1421, 
1430 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1103 (1995). 
The New Jersey Superior Court in Baliko stated its view 
that the criminal law definition of the words "aid" and 
"abet," namely as meaning respectively " `to assist, support 
or supplement the efforts of another,' " and " `to encourage, 
counsel, incite or instigate the commission of a crime,' " 
should be applied in the civil context. Baliko 645 A.2d at 
1223 (quoting State v. Newell, 378 A.2d 47, 52 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1977)). In Passaic Daily News, the court only 
opined as to the lack of need for shared intent in the civil 
context, but did not otherwise discuss the elements of civil 
aiding and abetting. Although Passaic Daily News and 
Baliko provide some guidance, they fail to explore, let alone 
definitively establish, the full nature and scope of aiding 
and abetting liability under the LAD. Based on the limited 
available guidance, however, we conclude that the New 
Jersey Supreme Court would follow the Restatement of 
Torts to define aiding and abetting liability under the LAD. 
 
The Restatement of Torts provides that a person is liable 
for harm resulting to a third person from the conduct of 
another when he "knows that the other's conduct 
constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial 
assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct 
himself . . . ." Restatement (Second) of Torts S 876(b). 
Courts have recognized that this Restatement provision sets 
forth the standard for civil aiding and abetting liability. See 
Landy v. Federal Deposit Ins. Co., 486 F.2d 139, 162 (3d 
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974). The New 
Jersey Supreme Court relied on this provision in Judson v. 
Peoples Bank and Trust Co., 134 A.2d 761, 767 (N.J. 1957), 
to determine a defendant's liability for furnishing funds to 
a corporation when it knew the corporate assets were being 
used for the personal advantage of the president and 
director. Federal courts have subsequently relied on Judson 
as evidence that New Jersey has adopted the Restatement 
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standard of civil aiding and abetting liability. See, e.g., 
Pereira v. United Jersey Bank, 201 B.R. 644, 671 (S.D.N.Y. 
1996); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Spagnoli, 811 F. Supp. 
1005, 1014 (D.N.J. 1993). In addition, a federal district 
court applying a New Jersey securities law relied on the 
elements of aiding and abetting liability derived in Landy 
from the Restatement. See Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm'n v. American Metals Exch. Corp., 775 F. Supp. 767, 
782 (D.N.J. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 991 F.2d 71 (3d 
Cir. 1993). In Tyson, apart from its discussion of the shared 
intent requirement, the court recognizes that an aider and 
abettor must "willfully and knowingly" associate himself 
with another's unlawful act. See 918 F. Supp. at 840.10 
 
We find no reason to believe that the New Jersey 
Supreme Court would adopt a construction of civil aiding 
and abetting liability under the LAD that differs from the 
Restatement. Both Passaic Daily News and Baliko are 
consistent with this understanding of aiding and abetting. 
The Restatement requires that an aider and abettor 
knowingly give assistance or encouragement. It does not 
incorporate the shared intent requirement rejected in 
Passaic Daily News. Furthermore, the Restatement, like 
Baliko, focuses on whether the aider or abettor has actually 
provided assistance or encouragement. Accordingly, we 
predict that the New Jersey Supreme Court would find that 
an employee aids and abets a violation of the LAD when he 
knowingly gives substantial assistance or encouragement to 
the unlawful conduct of his employer. The jury in this case 
was asked in the first interrogatory whether Jacalone 
"engaged in discriminatory conduct." The district court's 
instruction regarding this question informed the jury that 
Jacalone could be found to have engaged in discriminatory 
conduct if he knew Failla was handicapped and needed an 
accommodation, but failed to transfer him. As set forth 
above, we have concluded that aiding and abetting requires 
that one know the other's conduct constitutes a breach of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. We note that the district court appears to interpret Tyson as 
establishing that any supervisor who engages in discriminatory conduct 
within the scope of his employment is liable as an aider and abettor, 
while we view Tyson as suggesting that such a supervisor may be liable 
if he acts with the requisite knowledge and willfulness. 
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duty and give substantial assistance or encouragement to 
that conduct. The court's instruction, requiring only 
knowledge of Failla's circumstances of having a handicap 
and being in need of an accommodation, combined with 
inaction, falls short of this standard. The court did not 
advise the jury that Jacalone could be liable as an aider 
and abettor only if he knew the failure to accommodate 
Failla's handicap was a breach of his employer's duty and 
if his inaction actually assisted or encouraged the unlawful 
act.11 
 
We note that, as the district court instructed the jury, it 
is fundamental to aiding and abetting liability that the aider 
and abettor acted in relation to a principal, here, the 
employer, the city. Once the city has been found liable, the 
issue becomes whether under S 12(e), any employee is liable 
for aiding and abetting. Employees are not liable as aider 
and abettor merely because they had some role, or 
knowledge or involvement. Rather, the degree of 
involvement, knowledge and culpability required as a basis 
for liability is heightened by the standard that the 
Restatement sets forth and we adopt. Only those employees 
who meet this heightened standard will be aiders and 
abettors. It is important that this standard be set above 
mere knowledge and/or implementation, lest a reverse 
respondeat superior liability could be created under the 
guise of aiding and abetting. 
 
Accordingly, we agree with appellants that the jury's 
answers to interrogatories in this case were insufficient to 
establish Jacalone's liability as an aider or abettor. Because 
the interrogatories and corresponding instructions did not 
properly state the elements of aiding and abetting liability, 
we conclude that a new trial on the issue of Jacalone's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. The court in Tyson found that a failure to act cannot give rise to 
aiding and abetting liability. See 918 F. Supp. at 841. We decline to 
adopt such a per se rule regarding liability for inaction. Rather, we 
conclude that inaction can form the basis of aiding and abetting liability 
if it rises to the level of providing substantial assistance or 
encouragement. See Dici v. Pennsylvania, 91 F.3d 542, 553 (3d Cir. 
1996) (noting that a plaintiff states a claim for aiding and abetting 
harassment if he alleges that a supervisor knew of the harassment but 
repeatedly refused to stop it). 
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individual liability is required. See NBO Indus. Treadway 
Cos. v. Brunswick Corp., 523 F.2d 262, 275 (3d Cir. 1975), 
rev'd on other grounds, 429 U.S. 477 (1977). 
 
C. 
 
We next consider appellants' argument that the district 
court committed reversible error by permitting Failla to 
testify that he received a worker's compensation award for 
a partial permanent disability and by admitting a copy of 
the judgment, with the amount of the award redacted, into 
evidence. Appellants now contend that this evidence was 
irrelevant and was highly prejudicial, and should have been 
excluded under Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 403. At 
trial, appellants only argued lack of relevance (and not the 
application of Rule 403), and the district court determined 
that the evidence was relevant because it tended to prove 
that Failla "had something wrong with him." We cannot find 
the court's ruling an abuse of discretion. The test of 
relevance under the Federal Rules of Evidence is low. 
"Because [Rule 401] makes evidence relevant `if it has any 
tendency to prove a consequential fact, it follows that 
evidence is irrelevant only when it has no tendency to prove 
the fact.' " Blancha v. Raymark Indus., 972 F.2d 507, 514 
(3d Cir. 1992) (quoting 22 Charles A. Wright & Kenneth W. 
Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence S 5166, 
at 74 n. 47 (1978)). We cannot conclude that the district 
court erred in determining that the worker's compensation 
judgment tended to prove that Failla was disabled or 
handicapped. See Starceski v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 54 
F.3d 1089, 1099 n.12 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting that the 
admission of evidence of an EEOC determination is 
committed to the discretion of the trial court); Dickerson v. 
State of N.J. Dep't of Human Serv., 767 F. Supp. 605, 612 
(D.N.J. 1991) (recognizing the probative value of an EEOC 
determination). 
 
Appellants raised their argument under Rule 403 for the 
first time on appeal.12 Accordingly, they waived any 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. We note that during his opening statement, Failla's counsel referred 
to the amount of the worker's compensation judgment. Jacalone's 
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objection based on Rule 403, and we consider only whether 
the admission of the evidence constituted plain error. See 
Walden v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 126 F.3d 506, 517 (3d Cir. 
1997), petition for cert. filed, Feb. 17, 1998 (No. 97-1380). 
Rule 403 requires a balancing which the district court is in 
the best position to evaluate. See United States v. Gatto, 
995 F.2d 449, 457 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 948 
(1993). "[W]hen a trial court is not given an opportunity to 
exercise its discretion in striking the balance, we will 
seldom find plain error . . . ." Id. On appeal, appellants 
have not even argued that the admission of the evidence 
constitutes plain error, and we do not find plain error here. 
 
Appellants also object to the admission of this evidence 
based on several arguments that might be worthy of 
consideration if the district court had given collateral 
estoppel effect to the worker's compensation determination 
of Failla's disability.13 However, that was not the case and 
the district court so stated. It was clear that the district 
court admitted evidence of the worker's compensation 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
counsel objected, without stating the grounds for the objection, and the 
district court sustained the objection and instructed the jury to 
disregard the statement. Immediately after the opening statements, 
however, the district court clearly explained that it sustained the 
objection only because counsel referred to the amount of the award, but 
that reference to the mere fact that Failla collected worker's 
compensation would be admissible. Appellants did not raise any 
objection at that time, or when Failla testified. At the close of Failla's 
case, his counsel requested that the district court take judicial notice 
of 
the judgment, and Jacalone's counsel objected on relevancy grounds. 
Appellants' counsel did not articulate any further objection to the 
evidence until just prior to the closing arguments, at which time 
Jacalone's counsel asserted that he had objected to the evidence 
throughout the trial. Even at that time, however, he did not contend that 
the evidence was unduly prejudicial under Rule 403. 
 
13. Appellants argue that the standard of proof in a worker's 
compensation proceeding differs from the standard of proof in this civil 
action, and that Jacalone was not a party to the worker's compensation 
proceedings. Even the cases appellants cite on appeal in support of these 
arguments are directed at collateral estoppel issues. See City of 
Hackensack v. Winner, 410 A.2d 1146 (N.J. 1980); Ensslin v. Township 
of North Bergen, 646 A.2d 452 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994). 
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judgment merely as evidence tending to show that Failla 
was disabled or handicapped, not for collateral estoppel 
purposes. Accordingly, appellants' arguments are 
misplaced, and we find no grounds for reversible error in 
the district court's admission of evidence relating to the 
worker's compensation judgment.14 
 
D. 
 
Finally, we address appellants' challenges to the district 
court's award of attorneys' fees. Appellants assert this 
argument by incorporating by reference arguments offered 
to the district court in opposition to Failla's fee petition. We 
have reviewed the record before the district court, in which 
appellants disputed Failla's counsel's billing rate, the 
number of hours reasonably expended on the case, and the 
award of a contingency enhancement. Notwithstanding 
appellants' failure to adequately articulate and support 
their arguments on appeal with reference to the proper 
standard of review, we have reviewed the district court's fee 
award and conclude that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion.15 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. We do note that the evidence of the worker's compensation judgment 
was cumulative of Failla's expert witness testimony. However, we find 
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant 
a 
new trial on this basis. See Threadgill v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 
928 F.2d 1366, 1370 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 
15. Specifically, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court's 
determination of the lodestar or the contingency enhancement. With 
respect to the lodestar, we find that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in setting the hourly rate or in declining to reduce the number 
of hours reasonably expended on the litigation. We reject appellants' 
argument that the district court should have deducted time to reflect 
Failla's unsuccessful claims and his limited success. Although Failla did 
not succeed on every claim originally asserted in his complaint, the 
successful and unsuccessful claims all arose from a common core of 
fact. Compare Rendine v. Pantzer, 661 A.2d 1202, 1226 (N.J. 1995) 
(quoting Rode, 892 F.2d at 1177) (noting that a court may reduce the 
claimed hours to reflect unsuccessful claims that are distinct in all 
respects from successful claims). Furthermore, the jury awarded Failla 
$143,000 in compensatory damages and the district court found that the 
verdict represented a significant vindication of civil rights. In these 
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We also reject the tenor of appellants' sparse discussion 
of the fee issue in its brief on appeal, which urges that we 
reverse the fee award because the district court should 
have considered the City's status as a public entity, and 
should not have viewed it as a "deep pocket." Appellants 
cite no cases in support of this argument, and wefind the 
City's public status entirely irrelevant. The LAD provides 
that attorneys' fees may be awarded to prevailing parties 
without any reference to the losing party's ability to pay. 
See N.J.S.A. S 10:5-27.1. The mere fact that the City is a 
public entity does not relieve it of its obligation to pay 
attorneys' fees when it is found liable for unlawful 
discrimination. See Robb v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 635 
A.2d 586 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1993) (awarding 
attorneys' fees against a local school board). Accordingly, 
we find no abuse of discretion in the district court's award 
of attorneys' fees. 
 
IV. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse in part the 
district court's order denying appellants' motions for 
judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial, insofar as 
the district court found that individual liability should be 
imposed on Jacalone. We will affirm that order in all other 
respects, and will affirm the district court's award of 
attorneys' fees. We will affirm the judgment entered against 
the City and Police Department. We will vacate the 
judgment entered against Jacalone, and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
circumstances, the district court was not required to reduce the lodestar 
to reflect any "limited" success. Furthermore, we find that the time 
records -- which chronologically identified various activities and the 
time 
expended by particular attorneys -- were sufficiently specific under 
Rendine because they enabled the district court to determine the nature 
of the services for which compensation was sought. See id. at 1227 
(quoting Lindy Bros. Builders v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary 
Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 167 (3d Cir. 1973)). Finally, the court's award of a 
thirty-five percent contingency enhancement is within the range 
identified by Rendine for typical cases. See id. at 1231. 
 
                                20 
  
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
 
                                21 
